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Abstract
Recently, the problem of allocating one resource per agentwith initial endowments (house markets) has seen a renewed in-
terest: indeed,while in the general domainTopTradingCycle (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) is known to be the only procedure
guaranteeing Pareto-optimality, individual rationality, and strategy proofness (Ma, 1994), the situation differs in single-
peaked domains. Bade (2019) presented the Crawler, an alternative procedure enjoying the same properties (with the
additional advantage of being implementable in obviously dominant strategies); while Damamme et al. (2015) showed
that allowing mutually beneficial swap-deals among the agents was already enough to guarantee Pareto-optimality. In
this paper we significantly deepen our understanding of this decentralized procedures: we show in particular that the
single-peaked domains happen to be “maximal” if one wishes to guarantee this convergence property. Interestingly, we
also observe that the set of allocations reachable by swap-deals always contains the outcome of the Crawler. To further
investigate how these different mechanisms compare, we pay special attention to the average and minimum rank of the
resource obtained by the agents in the outcome allocation. We provide theoretical bounds on the loss potentially in-
duced by these procedures with respect to these criteria, and complement these results with an extensive experimental
study which shows how different variants of swap dynamics behave. In fact, even the simplest dynamics exhibit very
good results, and it is possible to further guide the process towards our objectives, if one is ready to sacrifice a bit in
terms of decentralization. On our way, we also show that a simple variant of the Crawler allows to check efficiently that
an allocation is Pareto-optimal in single-peaked domains.
Keywords: Distributed Artificial Intelligence; Fair allocation; Decentralized resource allocation
1. Introduction
Fair allocation is a research agenda that has been ex-
tensively studied in the recent years. It is a particularly
dynamic field in both artificial intelligence (Brandt et al.,
2016, Part II) and economics (Moulin, 2018). It investi-
gates the issue of allocating a set of objects to a set of
agents while taking into account their preferences. Two
distinct settings are usually considered, depending on
whether the objects are divisible or not. In this work, we
focus on the latter, assuming that every object is indivis-
ible hence can only be allocated entirely and to a single
agent. The setting we are interested in is even more re-
stricted as we also assume there is exactly one resource
per agent. This setting is usually referred to as house mar-
kets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974).
In this basic but very common setting, the celebrated
top trading cycle (TTC) algorithm (Shapley and Scarf, 1974)
is known to satisfy numerous key desirable properties:
Pareto-efficiency, strategy-proofness and individual ra-
tionality (Shapley and Scarf, 1974; Roth, 1982). This
procedure is in fact the only one to satisfy these three
properties in housemarkets with strict preference orders,
i.e. when agents express strict linear orders over the re-
sources (Ma, 1994).
IPart of this work was presented in the 14th AAMAS conference
(Damamme et al., 2015).
An interesting way to get around Ma’s result is to con-
sider different preference domains. Aziz and De Kei-
jzer (2012) extended the preference domain of strict linear
orders by allowing for indifferences between the items.
It is also possible to investigate relevant domain restric-
tions such as the single-peaked domain (Black, 1948; Ar-
row, 1951). In this domain, preferences are decreasing
the further you go from the most preferred resource of
each agent. This domain restriction is commonly encoun-
tered in various real-world problems where some charac-
teristics of the resources inherently define a common axis:
political trends of candidates in elections (Bruner and
Lackner, 2015), storage capacities for hard-disks, sizes for
clothes... In politics for instance, preferences usually de-
crease when considering candidates further away on the
political spectrum, from the most preferred candidate.
In resource allocation, single-peaked preferences are also
particularly relevant. Take for instance agents who are
looking for houses in a street which has a metro station at
one of its end, and a bike rental platform at the other end.
The agents’ preferences are likely to be single-peaked de-
pending on their favorite means of transportation. In this
paper, we will focus on this natural preference domain.
Recently, Bade (2019) has also considered house mar-
kets under single-peaked preferences and introduced a
new allocation procedure called the Crawler that is effi-
cient, strategy-proof and individually rational. It is more-
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over strictly different from TTC, hence weakening Ma’s
result under single-peaked preferences. In addition to
satisfy the same properties as TTC, the Crawler is also
easier to understand in the sense of obviously dominant
strategies (Li, 2017). Bade (2019) proved that the Crawler
can be implemented using obviously dominant strategies
while TTC can not be, even on the single-peaked domain.
Nevertheless, both the TTC algorithm and the Crawler
suffer from some drawbacks of centralized procedures:
they rely on a benevolent central authority to proceed.
Depending on the context, either more stringent guaran-
tees in terms of strategy-proofness, or more decentraliza-
tion, may be desirable.
Centralized proceduresmay be perceived as less fair, in
particular their outcomes are less acceptable by the agents
(Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut and Walker, 1975; Van den Bos
et al., 1997). Moreover these procedures require rather
advanced communication and coordination protocols.
Indeed both procedures can potentially involve long cy-
cles of resource reallocations between agents. In some
real life scenarios such cycles may not be acceptable, for
example in the kidney exchange problem they are impos-
sible to implementwhile taking into account the time con-
straints (kidney exchange programs usually restrict ex-
change cycles to sizes two or three (Roth et al., 2005)). The
probability of failure also increases with the size of the
cycle. This issue is orthogonal to the question of decen-
tralization: centralized procedures can be designed (and
are, in the case of kidney exchanges) so as to restrict the
size of cycles involved.
An alternative approach is based on decentralized dy-
namics based on local exchanges between agents. In this
model, long cycles pose real challenges (Rosenschein and
Zlotkin, 1994) as they involve distributed coordination
among numerous agents in order to exchange the re-
sources. In a related version of this paper, Damamme
et al. (2015) presented and analysed the simplest possible
local deals: the swap-deals. There, agents randomly meet
each other, in a pairwise fashion, and exchange their re-
sources if they both benefit from it. The process iterates
until a stable state, an equilibrium, is reached. On the
single-peaked domain, Damamme et al. (2015) showed
that the swap-deal procedure is efficient: every alloca-
tion stablewith respect to swap-deals is Pareto optimal. A
similar link between local deals and global properties in
housemarkets was recentlymade by Kondratev andNes-
terov (2019), who established that a matching is popular
if and only if no (majority) improving exchanges between
3 agents exist.
1.1. Contribution
This paper focuses on house markets with single-
peaked preferences. In this setting we first discuss the
Crawler procedure (Bade, 2019). Inspired by the Crawler
we introduce the Diver, a procedure that checks whether
an allocation is Pareto-optimal or not, which is asymptot-
ically optimal in terms of communication complexity.
Next, we investigate swap-deal procedures. We signifi-
cantly extendDamamme et al. (2015) results on the swap-
deal procedure by showing that the single-peaked do-
main is amaximal domain onwhich the procedure is effi-
cient. Although not all allocations Pareto-dominating the
initial allocation can be reached by swap-deals, it turns
out, interestingly, that outcomeof theCrawler always can.
We then investigate the cost of such decentralized pro-
cedure, when the objective is either to maximize the av-
erage or minimum rank of the resource obtained by the
agents. We show that the bounds found in Damamme
et al. (2015) for more general settings are also valid in the
single-peaked domain.
Finally, we explore experimentally the different proce-
dures discussed in this paper. These experiments high-
light that the swap-deal procedure performs particularly
well for these objectives. We further show that very few
number of swap-deals are needed before reaching a stable
allocation emphasizing the interest for such procedures.
1.2. Outline of the paper
We first present some related works (Section 2) and we
introduce our model and the different criteria used to as-
sess both the allocations and the procedures in Section 3.
Section 4 presents the state-of-art allocation procedures
discussed in this paper. The Diver procedure is explored
in Section 5while the swap-deal procedure is investigated
in Sections 6 and 7. Section 8 deals with the price of de-
centrality. The experimental analysis is presented in Sec-
tion 9. Finally a discussion over our results and a conclu-
sion are given in Section 10.
2. Related works
The theory of fair division has been introduced by
Steinhaus (1948) who defined "the Problem of Fair Di-
vision". This seminal work has led to an extensive liter-
ature in economics (see Young (1995); Moulin (2004) or
Moulin (2018) for complete surveys). Most of theseworks
focus on settings with divisible resources and/or allow
for monetary transfers between the agents. Henry (1970)
and Shapley and Scarf (1974) are among the first ones to
consider indivisible resources. While in the former an ad-
ditional divisible resource plays the role of money, in the
latter all the resources are assumed to be indivisible.
Fair division was introduced later in computer science
and artificial intelligence, through the study of the cake
cutting problems (Brams and Taylor, 1996): a divisible
and heterogeneous resource is to be divided among a
finite set of agents. A wide literature has been developed
since then, enriching the economists’ approach bymainly
focusing on the computational issues (Chevaleyre et al.,
2006). Another line of research has paid particular
attention to settings involving indivisible resources as it
poses more technical issues. We refer the reader to the
following surveys on this literature: Nguyen et al. (2013),
Bouveret et al. (2016) and Lang and Rothe (2016).
In the present paper we focus on the model defined by
Shapley and Scarf (1974), called house market or assignment
problem, in which there are exactly as many indivisible re-
sources as agents and nomoney. Shapley and Scarf (1974)
defined the top-trading cycle (TTC) procedure which has
been extensively studied (Roth, 1982) and shown to be
unique when preferences are strict (Ma, 1994).
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Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) renewed the interest
for the assignment problem in the economic literature by
investigating randomized procedures. Subsequent work
by Kasajima (2013) introduced single-peaked preferences
in their setting. Hougaard et al. (2014) later considered
deterministic and probabilistic solutions under single-
peaked preferences.
Aziz and De Keijzer (2012) defined a set of Pareto-
efficient procedures generalizing the TTC algorithm
when allowing for indifferences, which however include
procedures that are not strategy-proof. Plaxton (2013)
and Saban and Sethuraman (2013) independently pro-
posed general frameworks for efficient and strategy-proof
generalization of the TTC procedure with indifferences.
Bade (2019) explored another direction by restricting
preferences to single-peaked domains. In this case she
presents the Crawler that satisfies the same properties
as TTC hence overcoming Ma’s result (Ma, 1994) on the
single-peaked domain.
Following this line of work, we assume single-peaked
preferences in this paper. This domain of preferences
has been introduced by Black (1948) and Arrow (1951).
It has been more specifically studied in voting theory
and now are a very common domain of preferences
(Moulin, 1991; Elkind et al., 2017). Numerous works
have used single-peaked preferences in the context of
fair division. Sprumont (1991) studied the fair division
problem with single-peaked preferences and divisible
objects. He defines and characterizes the uniform al-
location rule, the unique strategy-proof, efficient and
anonymous allocation rule in this setting. The fairness
properties of this rule have been subsequently explored
by Ching (1994) and Thomson (1994a,b) who showed
that it is envy-free, one-sided resource monotonic and
consistent. As already mentioned, Hougaard et al. (2014)
extended this research area to indivisible resources and
considered the problem of assigning objects to a line
under single-peaked preferences. Subsequently, Aziz
et al. (2017) investigated the computational aspects of
this assignment problem.
Most of the procedures we talked about, among which
the TTC algorithm, are centralized procedures which rely
on a benevolent entity to proceed. Of particular interest
for us are the decentralized procedures. A growing lit-
erature exists on such procedures. Herreiner and Puppe
(2002) and Brams et al. (2012) respectively introduced the
descending demand procedure and the undercute procedure,
two semi-decentralized procedures where the agents an-
nounce their preferred resources to a referee. These pro-
cedures return envy-free and balanced allocations when
there are two agents. Another semi-decentralized proce-
dure is the picking sequence in which agents come in turn
to pick one of the remaining resource (Brams and Taylor,
2000; Bouveret and Lang, 2011).
Following the development of multi-agent systems,
fully decentralized procedures have been defined
through the idea of local exchanges between agents in
the idea of Pigou-Dalton deals (Moulin, 1991). Sandholm
(1998) considered the problem of reallocating tasks
among individually rational agents. Endriss andMaudet
(2005) and Aziz et al. (2016) investigated different com-
plexity problems in this setting. Endriss et al. (2006)
and Chevaleyre et al. (2010) respectively characterized
the class of deals and the class of preferences required
to reach socially optimal allocations. Chevaleyre et al.
(2007) focused on reaching efficient and envy-free al-
locations. Similar procedures were also introduced in
the area of two-sided matching (Roth and Vate, 1990;
Ackermann et al., 2011).
The idea of using swap deals was explored for instance
by Abbassi et al. (2013), who studied barter exchange net-
works. Gourvès et al. (2017) and Saffidine and Wilczyn-
ski (2018) studied dynamics of swap-deals by consider-
ing an underlying social network constraining the possi-
ble interactions of the agents, and focusing on complexity
issues. These results were recently extended by Bentert
et al. (2019).
3. Preliminaries
We start by presenting the basic components of our
model and the different fairness and efficiency concepts
discussed in this paper.
3.1. The model
Let us consider a set N = {a1, . . . , an} of agents and
a set R = {r1, . . . , rn} of resources. An allocation pi =
〈pia1 , . . . , pian〉 is a vector of Rn whose components piai ∈
R represent the resource allocated to ai.
Agents are assumed to express their preferences over
the resources through complete linear orders. Using ordi-
nal preferences is a popular trend in fair division (Brams
et al., 2003; Bouveret et al., 2010; Aziz et al., 2015). We de-
notei agent ai’s preferences, where r1 i r2 means that
ai prefers r1 over r2.
A preference profile L = {i| ai ∈ N} is then a set
of linear orders, one for each agent. For a given linear
order, we use top() to denote its top-ranked item: ∀r ∈
R\{top()}, top()  r. Similarly, snd() refers to the
second most preferred resource in. With a slight abuse
of notation we will write top(ai) and snd(ai) to refer to
top(i) and snd(i). When it is not clear from the context
we will subscript these notations to specify the resource
set, for instance topR(ai) is the most preferred resource
for agent ai among resources in R ⊆ R. Given resource
r ∈ R and an agent ai ∈ N , we use rankai(r) to refer to
the rank of r in i, that is n for top(ai), n − 1 for snd(ai)
and so on1.
An instance is a vector I = 〈N ,R, L, pi0〉 composed of a
set of agents N , a set of resources R, a preference profile
L and an initial allocation pi0.
In some settings, natural properties of the agents’ pref-
erences can be identified, thus restricting the set of pos-
sible preference orderings. The notion of preference do-
main formalizes these restrictions. For a set of resources
R, we denote by LR the set of all linear orders over R.
Any subset D ⊆ LR is then called a preference domain.
1The rank would correspond to the Borda score an agent gives to a
resource.
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We say that an instance I = 〈N ,R, L, pi0〉 is defined
over a preference domain D if L ⊆ D i.e. the preferences
of the agents are selected inside D.
3.2. Single-peaked preferences
Under single-peaked preferences, the agents are as-
sumed to share a common axis C over the resources and
individual rankings are defined with respect to this axis.
Definition 1. LetR be a set of resources and C a linear order
(i.e. the axis) over R. We say that a linear order  is single-
peaked with respect to C if we have:
∀(r1, r2) ∈ R2 s.t. r2 C r1 C top(),or, top()C r1 C r2
}
⇒ r1  r2.
In other words,  is single-peaked over C if  is de-
creasing on both the left and the right sides of top(),
where left and right are defined by C.
For a given linear orderC, we call SPC the set of all the
linear orders single-peaked with respect to C:
SPC = { ∈ LR |  is single-peaked w.r.t. C}.
A preference domain D is called single-peaked if and
only if D ⊆ SPC for a given C. An instance I is said
to be single-peaked if it is defined over a single-peaked
preference domain.
Ballester andHaeringer (2011) provided a characteriza-
tion of single-peaked domains. In particular, they gave a
necessary condition for a domain to be single-peaked: it
should be worst-restricted (Sen, 1966).
Definition 2. An instance I = 〈N ,R, L, pi0〉 is worst-
restricted if for any triplet of resources (rx, ry, rz) ∈ R3, one
of them is never ranked last in the profile L restricted to these
three resources.
Proposition 1 (Ballester and Haeringer (2011)). If an in-
stance is single-peaked then it is worst-restricted.
Let us illustrate the single-peaked domain with a sim-
ple example.
Example 1. Let us consider the following linear orders defined
over 3 resources.
1: r1 1 r2 1 r3
2: r3 2 r2 2 r1
3: r2 3 r1 3 r3
4: r2 4 r3 4 r1
One can check that these orders define a single-peaked preference
profile with respect to C defined as: r1 C r2 C r3. In fact these
orders exactly correspond to SPC. However, let us consider the
following preferences.
1: r1 1 r2 1 r3
2: r3 2 r1 2 r2
3: r2 3 r3 3 r1
It can be checked that there is no linear order (i.e. axis) C
over which these preference are single-peaked. Indeed, they are
not worst-restricted: every resource of the triplet (r1, r2, r3) is
ranked last at least once, hence the preference domain is not
single-peaked.
3.3. Efficiency and fairness criteria for an allocation
There exists an extensive literature investigating how to
define the efficiency of an allocation (see Chevaleyre et al.
(2006) and Thomson (2016) for some surveys). The gold
standard in terms of efficiency of an allocation is Pareto-
optimality. We say that an allocation pi′ Pareto-dominates
another allocation pi if all the agents are weakly better off
in pi′ than in pi, with at least one agent being strictly better
off. An allocation pi is then called Pareto-optimal if and
only if there does not exist an allocation pi′ that Pareto-
dominates it.
The efficiency of an allocation can also be evaluated by
measuring the average rank (ark) of the resources held by
the agents defined as:
ark(pi) =
∑
ai∈N
rankai(piai),
Maximizing the average rank is equivalent in our case
to maximizing the utilitarian social welfare which is a
widely used measure of efficiency that dates back to the
idea of utilitarianism.
However, maximizing the average rank or searching for
Pareto-efficient solutions may not be satisfactory as it can
lead to particularly unfair allocations. The allocation in
which one agent receives all the resources and the others
nothing is Pareto-optimal but is unarguably unfair. For
this reason, many fairness criteria have been introduced.
In this paper, wewill focus onmaximizing theminimum
rank (mrk) of the resources held by the agents defined as:
mrk(pi) = min
ai∈N
rankai(piai).
When using the rank as cardinal utility function, the
minimum rank is equivalent to the egalitarian welfare.
Maximizing the minimum rank follows Rawls’ principle
of maximizing the welfare of the worst-off (Rawls, 1971).
It has been introduced by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978)
and is nowa very common rule in fair division (Thomson,
1983; Sprumont, 1996; Nguyen et al., 2014).
3.4. Properties of the procedures
We say that a procedure returning Pareto-efficient allo-
cations is Pareto-efficient. Moreover, when dealing with
procedures that take an initial allocation as an input, a
very common efficiency criteria is that of individual ratio-
nality. A procedure is said to be individually rational if,
in the final allocation, no agent is assigned an object less
preferred than the one she held in the initial allocation.
Let us illustrate it on an example.
Example 2. Let us consider the following instance with 5
agents and 5 resources. The preferences are presented below,
they are single-peaked with respect to r1 C r2 C r3 C r4 C r5.
The initial allocation pi0 = 〈r5, r1, r3, r4, r2〉 is defined by the
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underlined resources.
a1 : r1 1 r2 1 r3 1 r4 1 r5
a2 : r5 2 r4 2 r3 2 r2 2 r1
a3 : r3 3 r2 3 r1 3 r4 3 r5
a4 : r4 4 r3 4 r2 4 r1 4 r5
a5 : r4 5 r5 5 r3 5 r2 5 r1
The allocation pi0 is not Pareto-optimal as it is Pareto-
dominated by the squared allocation pi = 〈r1, r5, r3, r4, r2〉.
We have ark(pi) = 22 and mrk(pi) = 2. Note that the allo-
cation pi′ = 〈r1, r5, r3, r2, r4〉 would yield ark(pi′) = 23 and
mnk(pi′) = 3 but violates individual rationality for agent a4.
Another desirable property is strategy-proofness. An al-
location procedure is strategy-proof if no agent has an in-
centive to misreport her preferences, that is, no one can
obtain a better outcome by reporting false preferences.
4. Centralized allocation procedures for house market
This section introduces the centralized allocation pro-
cedures that will be studied in the rest of the paper. First,
wedescribe local deals thatwill be the basic component of
our procedures. Then, we show how the Top Trading Cy-
cle algorithm can be described accordingly to these deals
and finally we present the Crawler algorithm.
4.1. Improving deals
Following the work of (Sandholm, 1998), we consider
procedures where, departing from an initial allocation,
the agents negotiate deals so as to obtain more preferred
resources. Hence, agents make local improving deals (or
exchanges) until they reach a stable allocation, that is, an
allocation where no improving deal is possible. In our
context, the transfer of a resource from one agent to an-
other will be balanced by another resource to compensate
the loss of welfare. Another line of research consists in
assuming that some monetary transfers can compensate
disadvantageous deals (Sandholm, 1998; Endriss et al.,
2006; Chevaleyre et al., 2017). In this paper, we assume
that such monetary compensation is either not possible
or not desirable, for instance because of ethical reasons
(Abraham et al., 2007).
A deal consists in an exchange cycle µ = 〈a1, . . . , ak〉,
where ai ∈ N ,∀i ∈ J1, kK. Such deals model exchanges
where agent ai gives her resource to agent ai+1 for each
i ∈ J1, k − 1K and agent ak gives her resource to agent a1.
For the particular case of deals involving only two agents,
k = 2, we will talk about swap-deals. In our house market
model, it has to be noticed that any reallocation (permu-
tation of resources) can be implemented as a collection of
disjoint cycle-deals (Shapley and Scarf, 1974).
Definition 3. Let pi be an allocation, and µ = 〈a1, . . . , ak〉 a
deal involving k agents. The allocation pi[µ] obtained by apply-
ing the deal µ to pi is defined by:{
pi[µ]ai = piai−1 if i ∈ J2, kK,
pi[µ]a1 = piak otherwise.
G :
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
r1 r2r3 r4r5
Figure 1: Bipartite graph created by the TTC algorithm for pi0 as defined
in Example 2
A deal is said to be improving if pi[µ]ai i piai for every
agent ai involved in µ.
Note that a procedure applying only improving deals
trivially satisfies individual rationality.
Given an allocation pi, we denote by Ck(pi), k ≥ 2, the
set of all the improving deals of size at most k that can be
applied from pi:
Ck(pi) = {µ | µ is an improving deal and |µ| ≤ k}.
Definition 4. An allocation pi is stable with respect toCk, k ≥
2 if Ck(pi) = ∅.
It can be observed that any Pareto-efficient allocation
is stable with respect to Cn. Indeed, in a Pareto-efficient
allocation no deal can be improving.
4.2. Gale’s Top Trading Cycle algorithm
When investigating resource allocation in house mar-
ket, the Top Trading Cycle algorithm (TTC) (Shapley and
Scarf, 1974), attributed to David Gale, is well known to
satisfy the three main desirable properties of an alloca-
tion procedure: Pareto-optimality, individual rationality
and strategy-proofness.
The TTC algorithm takes as input an instance I =
〈N ,R, L, pi0〉 and proceeds as follow. The algorithm
maintains a set of available agents N and a set of avail-
able resources R where initially R = R and N = N .
At each step of the algorithm, a directed bipartite graph
G = 〈V,E〉, with V = N ∪ R, is defined. The nodes of G
represent agents in N and resources in R, and the set of
edges E is such that:
• there is a directed edge (ai, ri) between ai and ri if
and only if ri = topR(ai) i.e. agents are linked to
their preferred resource in R,
• there is a directed edge (ri, ai) between ri and ai if
and only if ri = pi0ai i.e. resources are linked to their
owner in pi0.
Note that there always exists at least one cycle inG and cy-
cles correspond to improving cycle-deals. The cycle-deals
constructed can be of size 1 if an agent already owns her
top resource in R. The TTC algorithm selects one of the
cycles µ in G, the agents and resources involved in µ are
then removed from N and R to obtain a new graph G′
with the new available agents and resources. The process
is iterated on the new graph G′ and pi0[µ] until reaching
an empty graph.
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Example 3. Let us consider the instance defined in Example
2, the first graph constructed during the TTC procedure is de-
picted in Figure 1. The resource and the agents are represented
so that the cycles in G appear clearly. The final allocation com-
puted by TTC is pi = 〈r1, r5, r3, r4, r2〉, the underlined allo-
cation in Example 2. The cycle-deals that can be applied are
µ1 = 〈a1, a2〉 and µ2 = 〈a3〉. The last one is a specific deal
involving only one agent which means that the agent keeps her
resource. Once these deals performed, there is no other improv-
ing cycle-deal between agents a4 and a5.
At this stage, it is important to recall that TTC makes
very few assumptions on the preferences domain. It only
assumes that each agent’s preferences are defined as com-
plete strict linear orders.
4.3. The Crawler
Bade (2019) proposed a new mechanism for resource
allocation problems in house markets under single-
peaked preferences. This mechanism has the same guar-
antees as TTC: Pareto-optimality, individual rationality
and strategy-proofness.
The agents are initially ordered along the single-
peaked axis according to the resource they initially hold.
The first agent is the one holding the resource on the left
side of the axis and the last agent is the one holding the re-
source on the right side of the axis. R is the list of available
resources ordered according to the single-peaked axis. N
is the list of available agents such as the ith agent of the list
is the one who holds the ith resource inR. The algorithm
then screens the agent from left to right2 and check, for
each agent ai, whether the peak of ai (her top preferred
resource among the ones available in R) is on her right:
• If the peak of ai is on her right, the algorithm moves
to the next agent on the right.
• If ai holds her peak ri, it is assigned to ai, ai and ri are
then removed fromN and R. The algorithm restarts
screening the agents from the left side of the axis.
• If the peak rj of ai is on her left, she picks rj . Let
t∗ be the index of rj and t the index of ai (we have
t∗ < t). Then, all the agents between t∗ and t − 1
receive the resource held by the agent on their right
(the resources “crawl” towards the left). ai and rj are
then removed fromN and R. The algorithm restarts
screening the agents from the left side of the axis.
The algorithm terminates when N and R are empty.
A formal description of the procedure is given in Al-
gorithm 1. Note that we make use of the sub-procedure
pick(at∗ , r,N,R, pi)which simply assigns the specified re-
source r to the specified agent at∗ in the allocation pi, and
then removes the agent and the resource from the lists
of available agents and resources, N and R respectively.
Since the list of resources is ordered following the single-
peaked axis and the ith agent in N corresponds to the
owner of the ith resource in R, the removal of r and at∗ is
in fact equivalent to assigning r to agent at∗ and crawling
the resources from right to left.
2Note that the algorithm can equivalently be executed from the right
to the left.
Algorithm 1: The Crawler procedure
Input: An instance I = 〈N ,R, L, pi0〉 single-peaked
with respect to C
Output: pi an allocation
1 pi ← empty allocation
2 R← R: list of resources sorted accordingly to C
3 N ← N : list of agents such as the ith agent of the list
is the one who initially holds the ith resource in R
4 while N 6= ∅ do
5 t∗ ← |N |
6 for t = 0 to |N | − 1 do
7 if rt t rt+1 then /* no crawl */
8 t∗ ← t
9 Break
10 end
11 end
12 r ← topR(at∗)
13 pick(at∗ , r,N,R, pi)
14 end
15 return pi
As observed by (Bade, 2019), the Crawler always termi-
nates. We also show that the Crawler runs in quadratic
time.
Proposition 2. The Crawler procedure terminates and its
complexity is in O(n2) where n is the number of agents.
Proof. Termination is proved by observing that |N | is
strictly decreasing at each step of the main while loop.
This loop is applied at most n times and each step of the
loop requires at most O(n) elementary operations. The
time complexity is then in O(n2).
Let us illustrate the execution of the Crawler on the in-
stance of Example 2.
Example 4. Let us return once again to Example 2. The exe-
cution of the Crawler is presented in Figure 2. First, agent a3
is the first agent whose top is not on her right, she thus receives
her top r3. The second step matches agent a4 to r4. On the third
step, agents a2 and a5 both have their top on the right but the
last agent a1 has her top on her left. a1 is then matched to her
top r1. Agent a5 is matched to r5 on the fourth step. Finally a2
is assigned resource r2.
At each step i of the procedure, the improving deal µi is ap-
plied: µ1 = 〈a3〉, µ2 = 〈a4〉, µ3 = 〈a1, a5, a2〉, µ4 = 〈a5〉
and µ5 = 〈a2〉.
One can observe that on this example the allocation returned
by the Crawler is not the same as the one returned by TTC. Both
procedures lead to the same minimum rank mrk but a higher
average rank ark for TTC: 22 against 21 for the Crawler.
5. Checking Pareto-optimality: the Diver
If our objective is simply to check Pareto-optimality of
a given allocation, one question to investigate is whether
we can gain advantage from the single-peaked domain or
not. Observe first that the Crawler could be used for that
purpose as it would return the initial allocation.
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Figure 2: The Crawler procedure run on Example 2. Each dashed box
corresponds to a step and a pair resource agent is boxed whenever the
resource has been allocated to the agent.
Observation 1. Let pi be a Pareto-optimal allocation, then the
Crawler returns pi when applied with pi as the initial allocation.
Proof. The proof is straightforward since the Crawler is
individually rational and Pareto-optimal.
However, the procedure would not enjoy better com-
plexity guarantees in that case. This is in contrast with
TTCwhich stops if it fails to find an improving cycle in the
first step. Hence, the complexity of the Pareto-optimality
test based on TTC would be onlyO(n2). The Crawler has
thus the sameworst-case running time as TTCwhen used
for that purpose. A worst-case instance can be described
as follows: suppose that all the agents (ordered from left
to right), have the next resource on their right as their top,
except for the last one who likes her own resource. In
that case, at each step, the Crawler would go through all
agents before realizing that the last one wants to keep her
resource.
We now present a slight variant of the Crawler, called
the Diver, which allows to check Pareto-optimality of
the initial allocation more efficiently. We first informally
present the modified procedure, which proceeds in a sin-
gle screening of the agents. The key difference with the
Crawler is that the procedure does not start a new screen-
ing once an agent picks a resource: it only checkswhether
the last agent who was happy to crawl for this resource
now agrees to dive to the next one.
At each step, the central entity asks the agent whether
she wishes to:
1. pick her current resource;
2. pass (expressing that she is happy to dive to the next
resource); or
3. pick a smaller resource.
Note that, each time an agent picks a resource, the cen-
tral entity communicates this information to the other re-
maining agents so that they can update their list of avail-
able resources.
In case (1), the agent (and her resource) are removed
and we enter a sub-protocol p′ where the center asks the
previous agents, one by one, whether they still agree to
dive to the next resource. This sub-protocol stops as soon
as one agent says yes, or there are no more agents to con-
sider. All the agents who said ’no’ pick their resources
and are themselves removed (with their resource). Note
that in case (3), we have the guarantee that there is indeed
a better resource available, otherwise the agent would
have picked her own resource (case 1). As soon as an
agent says she wants a smaller resource, the protocol
stops and returns ’not PO’. Alternatively, if the screening
goes through all the agents, then (as we shall prove) all
the agents left with their own resource, and the protocol
returns ’PO’.
The protocol is formally described in Algorithm 2.
Note that, unlike with the Crawler, the lists N and R
don’t need to be updated, but insteadwe record the list of
agents who crawl (or dive). The sub-procedure pick(ai, r)
simply assigns resource r to agent i, while pick(ai, r,D)
does the same, and removes agent i from the list D of
agents who crawl.
Algorithm 2: The Diver procedure
Input: An instance I = 〈N ,R, L, pi0〉 single-peaked
with respect to C
Output: PO if pi0 is Pareto-optimal and not PO
otherwise
1 pi ← list of pairs (ai, ri) such that agent ai holds
resource ri in pi0, sorted according to C for the
resources
2 D ← ∅: list of agents who crawl or dive
3 for (ai, ri) in pi do
4 if topR(ai) = ri then /* pick your top */
5 pick(ai, ri)
6 for aj in reverse(D) do
7 if rj aj ri+1 then /* if you don’t
dive, pick your resource */
8 pick(aj , rj , D)
9 else
10 Break
11 end
12 end
13 else if ri ai ri+1 then/* your top is on your
left: not PO */
14 return not PO
15 else /* crawl */
16 D ← D.append(ai)
17 end
18 end
19 return PO
Example 5. Coming back to Example 2, by applying the Diver
to the initial allocation pi0, the agents are first sorted as follows:
r1
•
a2
r2
•
a5
r3
•
a3
r4
•
a4
r5
•
a1
The Diver screens the agent from left to right and asks each
agent her wish:
• a2 passes;
• a5 passes;
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• a3 picks her current resource, a5 still agrees to pass;
• a4 picks her current resource, a5 still agrees to pass;
• a1 wants to pick a smaller resource (r1) → the Diver re-
turns ’not PO’.
Now let us consider the allocation pi = 〈r1, r5, r2, r4, r3〉
leading to the following order:
r1
•
a2
r2
•
a3
r3
•
a5
r4
•
a4
r5
•
a2
Again, the Diver screens the agent from left to right and asks
each agent her wish:
• a1 picks her current resource;
• a3 passes;
• a5 passes;
• a4 picks her current resource, a5 still agrees to pass;
• a2 picks her current resource, a5 picks her current re-
source, a3 picks her current resource→ all the agents left
with their resource and the Diver returns ’PO’.
Theorem 1. The Diver terminates in O(n log n) and returns
whether the initial assignment is Pareto-optimal or not.
Proof. Termination is obvious since the procedure pro-
ceeds in a single main screening. We first show that the
procedure is sound. First observe that when the Diver
returns ’PO’, all the agents must have picked their own
resource. Indeed, consider the last agent in the order:
this agent picked her resource (otherwise the procedure
would have returned ’not PO’). But now the previous
available agent in backward must also pick her resource
next (as there are no more possibility to dive), and so
on until there are no agents remaining. Now, follow-
ing the argument used in Bade (2019), consider all the
agents who picked their resource during this process, in
the order they picked it: they clearly all picked their best
available resource. The obtained matching is thus indeed
Pareto-optimal. On the other hand, when the Diver re-
turns ’not PO’, there is indeed an improving cycle, con-
sisting of the agent (say, aj) who chose a resource on her
left, and all the agents, from the owner of this resource to
aj , who are not matched yet.
In terms of complexity, sorting the agents according to the
single-peaked order can be done in O(n log n). Now for
the main loop of the procedure: in the reverse loop, note
that if k+ 1 agents are screened backwards, then k agents
are removed for good. Thus through the entire procedure
the reverse loop involves O(n) steps, and thus the main
loop takes O(n) as well, which is dominated by the cost
of sorting.
The same line of analysis allows us to derive a result
regarding the amount of communication induced by the
procedure. As we do not consider communication from
the center to the agents, the cost of communicating the
single-peaked order to agents is not counted here, andwe
see that the Diver only requires a linear number of bits (in
the number of agents) to be communicated.
Theorem 2. The Diver requires 4n bits of communication.
Proof. The key is to observe that sub-protocol p′ requires
overall n + n bits, as there may only be n agents saying
’no’ and n agents saying ’yes’ throughout the whole run
of theDiver. In themain loop of the protocol, the question
requires 2 bits to be answered. This makes overall 2n +
2n = 4n bits.
Thus, onlyO(n) bits of communication are needed. In-
tuitively, it seems unlikely that we can improve on this
protocol. We now show that this is asymptotically opti-
mal.
More formally, given an instance I = 〈N ,R, L, pi0〉
single-peakedwith respect toC, we consider the problem
CheckPO whose answer is yes if and only if pi0 is Pareto-
optimal. We assume thatC is known to the agents. With-
out loss of generality, we consider that ∀i ∈ N , pi0i = ri.
To prove the optimality of our bound, we will exhibit a
straightforward fooling set (Kushilevitz and Nisan, 1996)
to formally establish that the Crawler matches the lower
bound for CheckPO. We consider strict preferences for
the agents writtenLi in a profile L, and by a slight abuse
of notation we writeL|L′i to say thati is the preference
of agent ai in either L or L′. In our context, the fooling set
will be a collection of profiles F = 〈L1, . . . LK〉 such that:
1. for any i ∈ {1, . . .K} CheckPO’s answer on
〈N ,R, Li, pi0〉 is yes.
2. for any i 6= j, there exists L′ = 〈Li|Lj1 , · · · Li|Ljn 〉,
such that CheckPO’s answer on 〈N ,R, L′, pi0〉 is no.
By a standard result in communication complexity, it is
known that log |F| is a lower bound on the communica-
tion complexity of the problem (Kushilevitz and Nisan,
1996).
Proposition 3. In the single-peaked domain, the communica-
tion complexity of CheckPO is Ω(n).
Proof. Let us call a consensual profile the profile where
i=j for any (i, j), i.e. all the agents have the same lin-
ear orders over preferences. The consensual linear order
will be denoted by . We claim that the set F of the 2n−1
(single-peaked) consensual profiles constitutes a fooling
set.
To show this, first observe that in any such profile,
the original assignment pi0 is indeed Pareto-optimal. In-
deed, in a consensual profile, no trading cycle is possible.
Hence the aforementioned condition 1. of a fooling set is
satisfied.
Now to show that we can fool the function, consider
any pair of profiles (Li, Lj). Because these profiles are
different, there must exist at least one pair of resources
(rp, rq) such that rp  rq in Li, while rq  rp in Lj (it is
true for all agents since the profiles are consensual). Now
consider the agent ap (resp. aq) holding rp (resp. rq) in
pi0. Let us now consider a mixed profile L′ such that:
∀k ∈ N ,L′k =
{ Lik if k 6= p,
Ljk if k = p.
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Observe that now ap and aq have opposite preferences for
rp and rq and would prefer to swap, i.e. CheckPO’s an-
swer on 〈N ,R, L′, pi0〉 is no. This concludes the proof.
6. Swap-deal procedures
Both TTC and the Crawler require a central entity to
run the procedure with the drawbacks that were stated
in the introduction. Moreover, they often require long
cycles to be implemented. Asmentioned previously, such
deals may be complicated to implement ormay not be de-
sirable. In decentralized settings, a natural approach con-
sists in departing from an initial allocation and letting the
agents negotiate improving cycle-deals involving at most
k agents until reaching an allocation stable with respect
to Ck. We call such a procedure the Ck-procedure.
In general these procedures are not deterministic: from
a same initial allocation, many different stable allocations
can be reached. Let us see it with a simple example.
Example 6. Coming back to Example 2, by applying the deal
〈a1, a2〉 to pi0 (the squared allocation) we reach the underlined
allocation pi that is stable with respect to swap-deals and Pareto-
optimal.
However, applying the improving deals 〈a1, a5〉 and then
〈a1, a2〉 yields to the allocation 〈r1, r2, r3, r4, r5〉, that is also
Pareto-optimal, it moreover corresponds to the allocation re-
turned by the Crawler.
This example emphasizes the importance of specifying
how improving deals are selected when several ones are
available. Most of our results do not rely on any spe-
cific selection dynamic, however for the experiments pre-
sented in Section 9, such dynamics will be defined.
In this paper, we will more specifically focus on the
simplest version of cycle-deals: bilateral deals i.e. deals
involving exactly two agents (also denoted as C2). This
type of deals has the advantage of being easy to imple-
ment since it does not require many agents to meet each
other and to coordinate.
Since TTC and the Crawler both provide desirable
guarantees, under single-peaked preferences, on Pareto-
optimality, individual rationality and strategy-proofness,
it is natural to investigate whether the C2 procedure also
provides such good properties.
First, observe that the swap-deal procedure is individ-
ually rational: throughout the procedure only improving
swap-deals are performed, hence an agent can only im-
prove her satisfaction at each step of the procedure. In
the "worst-case" an agent will not perform any deal dur-
ing the procedure and will own the same resource as in
the initial allocation. This is true for everyCk-procedures.
However, we show here that the swap-deal procedure
is not strategy-proof.
Proposition 4. The swap-deal procedure is not strategy-proof.
Proof. Let us consider the following instance single-
peaked with respect to r1 C r2 C r3 and where the initial
allocation pi0 is represented by the underlined resources.
a1 : r2 1 r3 1 r1
a2 : r2 2 r3 2 r1
a3 : r1 3 r2 3 r3
In pi0, 〈a2, a3〉 is an improving swap-deal, it leads to the
allocation pi = 〈r3, r2, r1〉.
Let us now consider the following preference profile
L′ in which a1 misreports her preferences, inverting the
order between r2 and r3,.
a1 : r2 ′1 r1 ′1 r3
a2 : r2 ′2 r3 ′2 r1
a3 : r1 ′3 r2 ′3 r3
Note that the preference profile is still single-peakedwith
respect to C.
In this scenario two improving deals are possible from
pi0: µ1 = 〈a2, a3〉 as before and a new deal µ2 = 〈a1, a2〉. If
µ2 is performed, a1 can later exchange r1 against r2 with
a3 thus owning her real most-preferred resource.
Let us suppose that µ2 will be performed with proba-
bility p and µ1 with probability 1− p. Agent a1 will then
receive top(a1) with probability p or do not perform any
deal with probability 1 − p. Overall, agent a1 has a strict
incentive to lie as long as p > 0, for p = 0 her lie will not
affect her outcome.
This proves that the swap-deal procedure is not
strategy-proof.
The swap-deal procedure does not satisfy the desirable
property of strategy-proofness while the Crawler and the
TTC algorithm do. One can view it as a cost emerging
from the decentrality of the swap-deal procedure. This
idea of a trade-off between decentrality and satisfaction
of desirable properties has already been observed in the
literature (Herreiner and Puppe, 2002; Brams et al., 2012)
and is explored in more depth in Section 8.
7. Efficiency of the swap-deal procedures
To complete the picture, we investigate the efficiency of
the swap-deal procedure by showing that any allocation
stablewith respect to swap-deals is Pareto-optimal. Then,
we show that the single-peaked domain is maximal for
this assertion.
7.1. Pareto-optimality of the swap-deal procedure
We show here that any allocation reached by the swap-
deal procedure is Pareto-optimal.
Theorem 3. In a single-peaked domain, every allocation pi sta-
ble with respect to C2 is stable with respect to Cn.
Proof. Let us consider, toward contradiction, an allocation
pi stable with respect to C2 but not with respect to Cn. As
pi is not stable w.r.t. Cn, there exists an improving deal
µ = 〈a1, . . . , ak〉, with 2 < k ≤ n, in pi. Let us show
by induction of the size of µ, denoted by k, that such an
improving deal cannot exist.
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First, note that as µ is an improving deal, we have:
piai−1 i piai , ∀ai ∈ µ, ai 6= a1
piak 1 pia1 . (1)
Then, observe that as C2(pi) = ∅, we have:
piai i piai+1 , ∀ai ∈ µ, ai 6= ak
piak k pia1 , (2)
otherwise, based on (1), an improving swap-deal would
exist in pi.
Base case (k = 3) Let us consider µ = 〈a1, a2, a3〉.
From (1) and (2), we obtain:
a1 : pia3 1 pia1 1 pia2 ,
a2 : pia1 2 pia2 2 pia3 ,
a3 : pia2 3 pia3 3 pia1 .
The triplet of resources 〈pia1 , pia2 , pia3〉 is thus a witness of
the violation of the worst-restrictedness (WR) condition
of a profile to be single-peaked (Proposition 1): all the
three resources are ranked last by an agent when we re-
strict our attention to these resources. The contradiction
if thus set.
Induction step Suppose now that pi is stable with re-
spect to Ck−1, we show that no improving deal of size k
exists in pi. From this induction hypothesis, we get that:
piai i piaj , ∀ai, aj ∈ µ, ai 6= a1, aj 6∈ {ai−1, ai},
pia1 i piaj , ∀aj ∈ µ, aj 6∈ {ak, a1}. (3)
Indeed if this condition was not satisfied, then there
would exist two agents al and a′l that are not next to one
another in µ such that pia′l l pial . It would then have
been possible to "cut" µ between those two agents so that
al receives pia′l . The new cycle deal obtained would also
have been improving and then an improving deal of size
strictly smaller than k would exist.
Let us now consider a triplet of resources O =
〈piaw−1 , piaw , piaw+1〉 such that piaw is ranked last by a given
agent when restricting preferences to O. Then from (1),
(2) and (3) we get:
aw : piaw−1 w piaw w piaw+1 ,
aw+1 : piaw w+1 piaw+1 w+1 piaw−1 .
Hence when restricting preferences to O, for every re-
source in O, there exists an agent ranking it last among
O’s resources. This violates the worst-restrictedness con-
dition of the single-peaked profile and sets the contradic-
tion.
This Theorem states that the Ck stable hierarchy col-
lapses at the C2 level when preferences are single-peaked
and in a house-market setting. It is particularly inter-
esting for us as it provides a characterization of Pareto-
optimality, as observed in Subsection 4.1.
Corollary 1. In a single-peaked domain and house-market, an
allocation pi is Pareto-optimal if and only if it is stable with re-
spect to C2.
Stating this result in terms of stability with respect to
Cn and not just Pareto-optimality is particularly interest-
ing as it can be shown that the same result holds for more
general settings than house markets (Beynier et al., 2019).
As we have proved that the allocation reached by
swap-deals is Pareto-optimal, a natural question is then
whether every allocation that Pareto-dominates the ini-
tial allocation can be reached by swap-deals. This is an-
swered by the negative by Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. There exists instances I = 〈N ,R, L, pi0〉 for
which there is an allocation pi that Pareto-dominates pi0 and that
can not be reached by a sequence of improving swap-deals.
Proof. Let us consider the following instance where the
initial allocation pi0 = 〈r3, r2, r1〉 is the one in the under-
lined boxes.
a1 : r1 1 r2 1 r3
a2 : r1 2 r2 2 r3
a3 : r2 3 r3 3 r1
The allocation pi = 〈r2, r1, r3〉, the boxed one, is Pareto-
optimal. However from pi0 only two deals are possible:
µ1 = 〈a1, a3〉 that reaches allocation 〈r1, r2, r3〉, or µ2 =
〈a2, a3〉 that leads to 〈r3, r1, r2〉. No sequence of improv-
ing swap-deals can thus reach pi.
It is however interesting to note that the allocation re-
turned by the Crawler can always be reached through im-
proving swap-deals.
Proposition 6. Let I = 〈N ,R, L, pi0〉 be an instance and let
piC be the allocation returned by the Crawler. Then piC is reach-
able by swap-deals from pi0.
Proof. We show that every cycle-deal of the Crawler can
be implemented as a sequence of improving swap-deals.
For clarity reasons and without loss of generality, we as-
sume that each agent aj currently holds resource rj . Let
us consider a step i of the procedure where the agent ai
picks resource rk currently held by ak. From the defi-
nition of the procedure, ak is on the left of ai (with re-
spect to the single-peaked axis) and ak has already been
considered at this step before considering ai. In fact, all
the agents between ak (included) and ai (excluded) on
the single-peaked axis have already been considered at
step i before reaching ai. Moreover, all these agents have
passed their turn because their peak is on their right. In
other words, each agent aj between ak (included) and ai
(excluded) prefers the resource held by the agent aj+1 on
her right. So, ∀j ∈ Jk, i− 1K : rj+1 j rj .
Let µi be the deal implemented by the crawler. µi =
〈ai, ai−1, · · · , ak+1, ak〉. In this deal, ak gives her resource
rk to ai and all the other agents of the deal give their re-
source to the next agent in the sequencewhich is the agent
on their left with respect to the single-peaked axis. The
decomposition of µi into a sequence of swap-deals con-
sists in using agent ai as a hub for the exchanges of re-
sources. Agent ai first swaps with ai−1 then, ai swaps
with ai−2 and so on until ai swaps with ak. At then end,
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ai holds rk and each other agent aj in µi holds the re-
source initially held by aj+1. The sequence of swap-deals
is thus equivalent to µi.
We now show that all these swap-deals are improving
exchanges. In the first deal 〈ai, ai−1〉, ai−1 receives the
resource ri held by ai that she prefers to her current re-
source ri−1 (as shown previously ri i−1 ri−1). ai re-
ceives the resource ri−1 held by ai−1 that she prefers to
her current resource since her peak is on the left of ai−1
(it is held by ak) i.e. ∀j ∈ Jk, i− 1K : rj i rj+1. Concern-
ing the next swap-deals 〈ai, aj〉 with j ∈ Jk, i − 2K, ai ex-
changes rj+1 that she obtained from her previous swap-
deal, against rj held by aj . aj receives the resource rj+1
that she prefers to her current resource rj (as shown pre-
viously rj+1 j rj). ai receives the resource rj that she
prefers to rj+1 (since ∀j ∈ Jk, i − 1K : rj i rj+1). All the
swap-deals are thus improving.
7.2. Maximality of the single-peaked domain
We show here that the single-peaked domain is maxi-
mal for the Pareto-efficiency of the swap-deal procedure:
for every preference domain strictly larger than SPC, for
a given linear order C, there exists an instance such that
the swap-deal procedure does not reach a Pareto-optimal
allocation.
Theorem 4. Let R be a set of resources and C a linear order
over R. For every preference domain D such that SPC ⊂ D,
there exists an instance I = 〈N ,R, L, pi0〉 defined over D
such that the swap-deal procedure on I does not reach a Pareto-
optimal allocation.
Proof. Let us construct an instance I = 〈N ,R, L, pi0〉 de-
fined overD such that swap-deal procedure on I does not
reach a Pareto-optimal allocation.
Without loss of generality and for the ease of the reader,
let us assume that C is such that r1 C r2 C . . .C rn.
Observe that, for every resource ri ∈ R there exists two
linear ordersti ∈ D andsi ∈ D that are single-peaked
with respect to C and such that top(ti) = top(si ) = ri
and snd(si ) = ri−1.
Moreover, as SPC ⊂ D, there exists a linear order ∗
∈ D that is not single-peaked with respect to C, hence
there exists two resources (rs−1, rs) ∈ R2 such that:
rs C rs−1 C top(∗),
or, top(∗)C rs−1 C rs
}
⇒ rs ∗i rs−1.
Without loss of generality, let us assume that top(∗) C
rs−1 C rs. We will use index t to refer to the top ranked
resource in ∗: rt = top(∗).
The preference profile L = {i | ai ∈ N} is then de-
fined as follows:
1=∗,

i
=ti−1, ∀ai ∈ N , i ∈ J2, tK,

i
=si , ∀ai ∈ N , i ∈ Jt+ 1, sK,
i=ti, ∀ai ∈ N , i ∈ Js+ 1, nK.
r1 · · · rt−1 rt rt+1rt+2 · · · rs−1 rs rs+1 · · · rn
a2 · · ·
at
a1 at+1at+2 · · · · · ·
as
as+1 · · · an
Figure 3: The instance constructed in the proof for Theorem 4. The
dotted lines represent the trend of the utilities, dots fixed points and
squares the resource allocated to each agent.
Let us now describe the initial allocation pi0:
pi0a1 = rs,
pi0ai = top(ai) = ri−1, ∀ai ∈ N , i ∈ J2, tK,
pi0ai = snd(ai) = ri−1, ∀ai ∈ N , i ∈ Jt+ 1, sK,
pi0ai = top(ai) = ri, ∀ai ∈ N , i ∈ Js+ 1, nK.
To get a better understanding, of the instance I =
〈N ,R, L, pi0〉 constructed in this proof, Figure 3 presents
the preference profile L and the initial allocation pi0.
We claim that pi0 is stable with respect to C2 but not
Pareto-optimal. Let us first show that C2(pi0) = ∅.
First observe that every agent ai, i ∈ J2, tK ∪ Js + 1, nK
owns her top resource, hence can not be involved in an
improving swap-deal.
Consider then agent ai, i ∈ Jt + 1, s − 1K, she owns
her secondmost preferred resourcewhich shewould only
trade in exchange of a most preferred resource, owned by
agent ai+1. However, agent ai+1 is not interested in piai ,
hence no improving swap-deal is possible.
Finally, let us consider agent as who owns her second
most preferred resource rs−1 and whose top resource rs
is owned by agent a1. By the hypothesis that a1’s pref-
erences are not single-peaked, we have rs 1 rs−1. Once
again there is no improving swap-deal involving agent as.
Overall, we have proved that C2(pi0) 6= ∅, hence the
swap-deal procedure on I returns pi0. Let us show now
that it is not Pareto-optimal. Observe the allocation in
which every agent receives her top resource is feasible as
no couple of agents have the same top resource, this allo-
cation clearly Pareto-dominates pi0.
To conclude the proof, we have constructed an instance
I = 〈N ,R, L, pi0〉 defined overD such that the swap-deal
procedure returns a Pareto-dominated allocation when
applied on I .
This result is particularly interesting since it shows
that the single-peaked domain captures in a "tight" way
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the domain under which the swap-procedure is Pareto-
efficient (in the vein of similar results obtained in Cheva-
leyre et al. (2010) in different settings). The single-peaked
domain is however not a characterization of this fact,
there exists some domains that are not single-peaked
but on which the swap-deal procedure returns a Pareto-
optimal allocation.
Example 7. Let us consider the following preference profile:
a1 : r1 1 r2 1 r3
a2 : r1 2 r3 2 r2
a3 : r3 3 r2 3 r1
This profile is not single-peaked over any linear order C: the
triplet 〈r1, r2, r3〉 is a witness of the violation of the worst-
restrictidness condition (Proposition 1), however we can show
that for every initial allocation, the swap-deal procedure returns
a Pareto-optimal allocation. Let us consider the different initial
allocations:
1. pi0 = 〈r1, r2, r3〉: C2(pi0) = ∅ and pi0 is Pareto-optimal.
2. pi0 = 〈r1, r3, r2〉: C2(pi0) = ∅ and pi0 is Pareto-optimal.
3. pi0 = 〈r2, r1, r3〉: C2(pi0) = ∅ and pi0 is Pareto-optimal.
4. pi0 = 〈r2, r3, r1〉: two swap-deals are possible:
(a) 〈a1, a3〉 which leads to case 2.
(b) 〈a2, a3〉 which leads to case 3.
5. pi0 = 〈r3, r1, r2〉: one swap-deal is possible: 〈a1, a3〉
which leads to case 3.
6. pi0 = 〈r3, r2, r1〉: three swap-deals are possible:
(a) 〈a1, a3〉 which leads to case 1.
(b) 〈a1, a2〉 which leads to case 4.
(c) 〈a2, a3〉 which leads to case 5.
This example does not contradict Theorem 4. The
swap-deal procedure is Pareto-efficient on the domain
D = {1 ,2 ,3} because D does not include every
single-peaked linear order over C. For instance take C
to be r1 C r2 C r3, extend D into D′ = D ∪ {r2  r1 
r3, r2  r3  r1} so that SPC ⊂ D′ and Theorem 4 will
apply.
8. The cost of decentralized procedures
It has become common to measure the cost induced by
adecentralized approachwhen compared to a centralized
one, by invoking the price of anarchy (PoA) (Koutsoupias
and Papadimitriou, 1999; Anshelevich et al., 2013). Tech-
nically, it amounts to compute the (worst-case, over all in-
stances) ratio of the worst stable outcome over the social
welfare optimum.
We take inspiration from this notion to understandhow
bad can be the decentralizedmyopic dynamics presented,
in terms of the criteria studied. In our analysis, three al-
locations are presented: two allocations pi∗ and pi which
happen to stand on the Pareto front, but exhibit a large
gap in terms of our criteria (pi∗ being the optimal in terms
of the criteria considered, and pi being as far as possible
from this value); togetherwith a third allocation pi0 which
happens to be Pareto-dominated by both pi∗ and pi.
Hence these instances can give rise to the following in-
terpretations.
• The gap between pi∗ and pi, in terms of our crite-
ria, shows the price induced by individual rationality
alone. Indeed, it could be that pi is the initial alloca-
tion, in which case any mechanism respecting indi-
vidual rationalitywould return pi as the outcome and
thus exhibit this gap in terms of our criteria. This is
not specific to our decentralized approach.
• If the swap-deal procedure starts from pi0, then it
may eventually reach pi, while a centralized proce-
dure specifically designed for that purpose, even re-
specting individual rationality, could return pi∗: the
same gap can thus exist if we consider pi0 as the ini-
tial allocation. This interpretation is closer in spirit
to the price of anarchy idea.
• Finally, as it turns out, even pi∗ could be reached
by a sequence of swap deals, starting from pi0, if
wisely guided throughout the process. Hence the
very same gap can also be seen as the price beingmy-
opic in the choice of which swap deals to make.
Proposition 7. The price of anarchy in terms of average rank
of the swap-deal procedure is 2 in the single-peaked domain.
Proof. Let us consider the following single-peaked in-
stances involving n agents. The initial allocation
pi0 = 〈r2, r3, r4, · · · , rn−1, rn, r1〉 is the underlined al-
location. From this allocation pi0, it is possible to
reach pi = 〈rn−1, r2, r3, · · · , rn−2, rn, r1〉 (the shaded al-
location) by performing n − 3 swap-deals between a1
and ai, ∀i ∈ J2, n − 2K (starting by the swap-deal
between a1 and a2 and finishing with the swap-deal
〈a1, an−2〉). From pi0, it is also possible to reach pi∗ =
〈rn, r1, r2, · · · , rn−3, rn−2, rn−1〉 (the white squared allo-
cation)which is both Pareto-optimal and optimal in terms
of average rank. The sequence of swap-deals leading to
such an allocation depends on the number of agents. If
the number of agents is even, we just have to perform se-
quence of couple of swap-deals 〈a2i, an〉 and 〈a2i+1, a1〉,
∀i ∈ J1, n2 −1K. If the number of agents is oddwe just have
to change the final swaps. We still perform the sequence
of couples of swap-deals described earlier but at the end
of the swap-deal concerning an−3 weperform the three fi-
nal swap-deals 〈an−2, an〉, 〈an−1, a1〉 and 〈an−1, an−2〉 in-
stead of 〈an−2, a1〉.
a1 : rn−1  rn  rn−2  rn−3 · · · r2  r1
a2 : r1  r2  r3  r4 · · · rn−1  rn
a3 : r2  r1  r3  r4 · · · rn−1  rn
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
an−2 : rn−3  rn−4  rn−5 · · · rn−2  rn−1  rn
an−1 : rn−2  rn−3  rn−4  rn−5 · · · rn−1  rn
an : rn−1  rn−2  rn−3  rn−4 · · · r1  rn
Wesee that ark(pi∗) = (n−1)·n+(n−1), while ark(pi) =
n·(n+1)/2, thus this instance shows that (asymptotically)
the PoA is≥ 2. In Damamme et al. (2015) it is shown that
2 is a lower bound for the PoA of swap procedures. We
thus conclude that PoA is 2, as in the general domain.
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Proposition 8. The price of anarchy in terms of minimum
rank of the swap-deal procedure is in Θ(n) in the single-peaked
domain.
Proof. Let us consider the following single-peaked in-
stances involving n agents. The initial allocation pi0 =
〈rn−1, r1, r2, · · · , rn−2, rn〉 is the underlined allocation.
From this allocation pi0, it is possible to reach pi =
〈r1, r2, r3, · · · , rn−1, rn〉 (the shaded allocation) by a se-
quence of couples of swap-deals 〈ai−1, an〉 and 〈ai−2, a1〉
∀i ∈ Jn, n − 2, · · · , 6, 4K if n is even. If n is odd, we
perform the same sequence of couples of swap-deals but
∀i ∈ Jn, n − 2, · · · , 7, 5K and by adding two final swap-
deals 〈a2, an〉 and 〈a1, an〉. From pi0, it is also possible to
reach pi∗ = 〈r1, r3, r4, · · · , rn, r2〉 (the white squared allo-
cation)which is both Pareto-optimal and optimal in terms
of average rank. This allocation is reached by performing
n− 2 swap-deals between a1 and ai ∀i ∈ Jn− 1, 2K.
a1 : r1  r2  r3  r4 · · · rn−1  rn
a2 : r2  r3  r1  r4 · · · rn−1  rn
a3 : r3  r4  r2  r1 · · · rn−1  rn
a4 : r4  r5  r3  r2 · · · rn−1  rn
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
a5 : r2  r1  r3  r4 · · · rn−1  rn
It is easy to see thatmrk(pi∗) = n−1, whilemrk(pi) = 1,
thus PoA is Ω(n). Clearly, the PoA cannot be worse, thus
it is Θ(n).
9. Experimental analysis
In this section, we investigate experimentally the swap-
deal procedure (C2) and compare it with the Top Trading
Cycle algorithm and the Crawler procedure. As proved
in Theorem 3, C2 procedures always return a Pareto-
Optimal allocation under single-peaked preferences. In
section 8, we described theoretical results dealing with
the price of anarchy. However, PoA considers the worst-
case ranks that can be obtained by C2 procedures. An-
other relevant question is to study the ranks obtained in
practice by these procedures. In the following experi-
ments, we study the average rank and the minimum rank
of the allocations reached by the different procedures in
comparison with the optimal values that can be com-
puted in a centralized way.
9.1. Experimental protocol
We consider and compare six distinct procedures: the
three procedures investigated in the paper (swap-deal
procedure, Crawler and TTC), the procedure C3 that re-
alizes improving deals of size 2 or 3 until stability, and
the two allocation rules "max ark IR" and "maxmrk IR"
which respectively returns the allocation maximizing the
average and theminimum rankswhile being individually
rational. For the last two allocation rules, the allocation
returned can be computed using the technique defined
by Garfinkel (1971).
Differentmethods can be envisioned to generate single-
peaked preferences. We consider impartial culture for
single-peaked domain (IC-SP) and uniform peak for
the single-peaked domain (UP-SP). Single-peaked prefer-
ences under impartial culture (IC-SP) are drawnusing the
method proposed byWalsh (2015). Given an axis, single-
peaked preferences are built by a recursive method from
the end (i.e. the worst resource of the agent) to the top
resource. At each iteration, the next resource in the pref-
erence order is randomly selected between the two ex-
tremes of the axis. The selected resource is then removed
from the axis and so on until the axis is empty. In the uni-
form peak culture (UP-SP), presented by Conitzer (2009),
preferences are constructed by first picking uniformly at
random a resource to be the peak. The second-highest
ranked resource is chosenwith equal probability from the
two adjacent alternatives, and so on until a full order is
obtained.
For each experiment, we varied the size of the instances
from n = 2 to n = 60 and we randomly generated 1000
instances for each size. For each instance, we ran the six
procedures mentioned above and we computed the effi-
ciency ratio of the outcomes averaged over the 1000 in-
stances. The efficiency ratio is defined as the ratio be-
tween the rank realized by the procedure and the max-
imal rank achievable for the instance without imposing
the individual rationality constraint (unlike the two al-
location rules "max ark IR" and "maxmrk IR"). We are
thus comparing relative efficiency of each procedure. Fig-
ures 4, 8 and 9 describe efficiency ratios for the minimum
rank and the average rank. We also compare the execu-
tion efficiency of the procedures by recording the number
of deals performed until convergence (see Figures 5 and
6) and the lengths of the cycle-deals (see Figure 7).
9.2. Selection dynamics for the swap-deal procedures
Concerning the C2 procedure, we investigated several
dynamics to select the improving deal to be performed
among all possible improving deals. Wemore specifically
focused on the following dynamics:
• Round Robin over the agents (C2 RRA): agents are
considered following the sequence 〈a1, . . . , an〉, the
first improving swap-deal found is implemented.
We thus consider swaps between pairs of agents in
the following order: (a1, a2), (a1, a3), . . ., (a1, an),
(a2, a3),. . ., (an−1, an).
• Uniform (C2 U): a swap-deal is selected uniformly at
random among all possible improving swap-deals.
• Priority to new (C2 PN): a swap-deal is selected uni-
formly at random among all the improving swap-
deals involving pairs of agents who have never per-
formed a deal yet. If no such pair of agents exists
all the improving swap-deals are considered and one
deal is selected uniformly at random. This dynamic
favours agents who have not exchanged yet.
• Priority to the worst-off agent (C2 PW): agents are or-
dered considering the rank of their resource from the
one with the lowest rank to the one with the highest
rank. The first improving swap-deal found is imple-
mented.
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• Round Robin over pairs of agents (C2 RRP): pairs of
agents are considered in the following sequence
(a1, a2), (a3, a4), . . . , (an−1, an), (a1, a3), (a2, a4) . . .
(a1, an), the first improving swap-deal found is
performed. This dynamics reduces the impact of the
agent ordering used in Round Robin.
It has to be noticed that implementing these dynamics
in a decentralizedwaymay require some additional com-
munication between the agents. Hence, round robin dy-
namics require the agents to know which pairs of agents
have already been considered. The dynamics giving pri-
ority to the worst-off requires each agent to know the
ranks of the other agents.
We first investigate whether the selection dynamics for
the swap-deal procedure C2 influences the efficiency of
the outcomes and the efficiency of the procedure. We
thus compared the dynamics in terms of efficiency and
in terms of number of swaps performed before reaching
a stable allocation.
Figure 4 presents the efficiency ratio for each selection
dynamic for IC-SP preferences (left side) and UP-SP pref-
erences (right side). Regarding the average rank of the
outcomes (lower part of Figure 4), all the dynamics ob-
tain very good results (above 90% under IC-SP and above
96%underUP-SP). It can also be observed that all dynam-
ics give similar values except C2 PW which gives better
results. Regarding the minimum rank (upper part of Fig-
ure 4), C2 PW also allows for reaching significantly better
allocations. In fact, this dynamic favours deals between
low ranked agents and thus tends to improve the rank
of the poorest agents. On the contrary, Round Robin dy-
namics tends to always favour the same agents and thus
often leads to lower minimum rank.
We also investigate how the various dynamics ofC2 in-
fluence the number of swaps performed by the agents.
On Figure 5, solid lines represent the mean number of
swap-deals performed when varying the size of the in-
stances. The dynamics that are not represented all per-
formed a number of swaps similar to either C2 RRA or
C2 U so, they are not plotted for readability reasons. Dot-
ted lines represent the highest and the lowest numbers of
swaps registered for an instance of a given size (averaged
over 1000 randomly generated instances).
It can be observed that all the dynamics lead to quite
the same average number of swaps. However, the num-
ber of swaps performed under UP-SP is significantly
higher than under IC-SP. This phenomenon is related to
the method used to generate single-peaked preferences.
As already mentioned by (Walsh, 2015), the probabili-
ties of the preference orders significantly differ from one
method to another. Under IC-SP, each single-peakedpref-
erence order has a uniform probability 12n−1 to be se-
lected. On the contrary, under UP-SP, probabilities over
preference orders are not uniform. In fact, the peak is
uniformly drawn (with probability 1n ) and single-peaked
preferences are then built from this peak. Since, there is
only one preference order for each peak at the ends of
the axis, these preference orders are more likely to be re-
turned than preference orders with a peak in the middle
of the axis. Let’s consider the case where n = 5 and the
TTC TTC Crawler Crawler
IC-SP UC-SP IC-SP UC-SP
β0 4.64 4.73 4.27 2.86
β1 0.15 0.36 0.20 0.56
R2 0.7872 0.9032 0.883 0.9862
p-value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
Table 1: Linear regression of the maximum size of the deals over the
number of agents. β0 and β1 are the coefficients of the regression:
maxSize = β0 + β1 ∗ NbAgent, R2 the coefficient of determination
and the p-value is the one of the model.
axis is r1 C r2 C r3 C r4 C r5. Preference orders r1  r2 
r3  r4  r5 and r5  r4  r3  r2  r1 both have a
probability 15 to be generated whereas the probability to
generate a preference orderwith the peak r3 is 15 and there
are 6 orders with this peak. Under IC-SP, the probability
to generate the preference order r1  r2  r3  r4  r5
is 116 .
The likelihood to obtain a preference profile where the
orders are very different is therefore more important un-
der UP-SP than under IC-SP. There is thus more chance
for the agents to make improving deals under UP-SP
than under IC-SP.Moreover, theworst-off agents aremore
likely to find an agent who may accept to perform a deal
and to improve their rank under UP-SP thus leading to
better results when considering the minimum rank.
The probabilities to obtain similar preference orders
can also explain the high variance in the number of swaps
under UP-SP. Indeed, when considering this culture, the
agents are more likely to have very different preference
orders. In this case, a lot of swaps are possible and would
be performed especiallywhen usingC2 RRA. In theworst
case, when two agents have opposite preference orders
(for instance, r1  r2  r3  r4  r5 and r5  r4  r3 
r2  r1) and hold their worst resource, C2 RRA requires
the agents to perform n − 1 deals before considering an-
other couple of agents. Such preference profiles lead to a
high number of deals compared to the average case and
are much more likely under UP-SP.
9.3. Centralized and decentralized procedures
The number of deals performed byC2 can be compared
with the number of deals induced by the TTC algorithm
or the Crawler algorithm. As shown in Figure 6, the last
two procedures perform less exchanges than the C2 pro-
cedures since they allow for larger sizes of cycle-deals.
Nevertheless, the sizes of the deals can be extremely large
as depicted in Figure 7. Although the average size of the
deals is quite low as shown by the solid lines in Figure
7, the size of the largest cycles can be large compared to
the number of agents (dotted lines in Figure 7). Hence, a
cycle-deal may involve more than half (resp. 35%) of the
agents under UC-SP and a fifth (resp. 15%) of the agents
under UP-SP for the Crawler (resp. TTC). The linear re-
gressions explaining these values are presented in Table
1. Such cycle-deals can be difficult to implement in prac-
tice since they require coordination between a large num-
ber of agents that may be hard to achieve as debated in
Section 1.
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Figure 4: Mean efficiency ratio for each dynamic of the swap-deal procedure and for each preference culture.
Figure 5: Mean number of swaps performed, the filled area represents the range, from the minimum to the maximum.
Figure 6: Mean number of cycles performed by TTC and the Crawler, the filled area represents the range, from the minimum to the maximum.
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Figure 7: Mean size of the cycles performed by TTC and the Crawler, the filled area represents the range, from the minimum to the maximum.
We now turn our attention to the efficiency of the
C2 procedures compared to the other centralized proce-
dures. The previous section showed a clear gap between
the dynamics giving priority to the agent with the low-
est utility compared to the others (C2 PW),. We thus fo-
cus on this dynamics when studying C2. We also keep
track of the C2 U dynamics as it can be implemented in a
fully decentralized way without additional communica-
tion between the agents.
We first report on the experiments about the average
minimum rank of the outcomes (upper part of Figure 8).
The first observation is that the results under UP-SP are
significantly lower than the ones obtained under IC-SP.
Under UP-SP, C2 PW reaches ratios over 80% whereas it
goes below 40% under IC-SP for 60 agents. Again, the
way the single-peaked are built and the correlation be-
tween the preferences of the agents have a major impact
on the performances of all procedures.
Another important observation is thatC2 performs sig-
nificantly better than the TTC algorithm and the Crawler
algorithm. C2 also outperforms C3 when considering the
minimumrank. The performances of TTCare not surpris-
ing since this algorithm implements the best cycle and
then discards the resources and the agents involved in
the deal. This significantly limits the range of possible
deals for the remaining agents and tends to disadvantage
low-ranked agents. On the other hand C2 PW favours
low ranked agents and gives more opportunities to these
agents to exchange their initial resources. Higher min-
imum ranks are then obtained. However, it can be ob-
served that even when the C2 U dynamics is considered,
swap deals outperform the TTC algorithm. Indeed, even
C2 U gives more chances for the agents with low-ranked
resources to perform some improving deals.
It can also be observed that C3 improves little over C2
when considering the same dynamics (Uniform selection
of the exchanges in this case). Slightly increasing the size
of the deals leads to few improvements while it raises
more complex coordination issues.
We then study the average rank of the outcomes ob-
tained by the different procedures (lower part of Figure
8). It can first be observed that C2 also gives very good
results when considering the average rank and C2 PW
outperforms all the other methods. All methods provide
outcomes with high average rank (above 89% under IC-
SP and above 96% under UP-SP). In particular C2 outper-
forms TTC and the Crawler under both cultures. Again,
it can be noticed that there is no significant difference be-
tween C2 and C3 when considering the same dynamics
and there is no interest to consider slightly larger deals.
These experiments promote the relevance of the C2
procedure: besides being simple to implement, C2 also
provides very good results both in terms of average rank
and minimum rank.
We conclude this section with a comparison between
the Top Trading Cycle algorithm and the Crawler algo-
rithm. As it can be seen on Figure 9, both algorithms give
quite similar performances regarding the minimum rank
and the average rank. Indeed, on Figure 9 both curves
almost always coincide. However, as depicted in Fig-
ure 6, the Crawler algorithms performs much more deals
than TTC algorithm. The size of the deals is also larger
when implementing the Crawler algorithm. The larger
number of deals and the larger sizes of deals performed
by the Crawler are related to the fact that agents are or-
dered with respect to the resource they initially hold and
with respect to the order of these resources on the single-
peaked axis. Based on this order, the Crawler only con-
siders deals µ = 〈a1, . . . , ak〉 such that ai and ai+1 (with
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · k − 1}) are owners of adjacent resources
on the axis. Hence, TTC allows a larger range of cycle-
deals than the Crawler. Of course, neither TTC or the
Crawler were designed to optimize these objectives: their
interest rely in the strong strategy-proofness that they
offer (and, for the Crawler, on the fact that it can even
be implemented in obviously dominant strategies (Bade,
2019)). Still, we believe these findings provide interesting
insights regarding the nature of outcomes they provide.
10. Discussion and conclusion
This paper considered the fair division problem of in-
divisible resources in the restricted setting of a house
market and under single-peaked preferences. We first
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Figure 8: Mean efficiency ratio for each procedure and for each preference domain.
Figure 9: Mean efficiency ratio for the Crawler and the TTC algorithm, the filled are represents the standard deviation.
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focused on centralized procedures with a particular in-
terest for the Crawler procedure, and showed that it can
be adapted to check Pareto-optimality with optimal com-
munication complexity using the Diver procedure. We
then turned our attention to decentralized procedures
and focused on swap-deals. The efficiency (in terms of
Pareto-optimality) of swaps-deals has been proved and
we showed that the single-peaked domain is maximal for
the swap-deal procedure. To refine our analysis, we also
concentrated on two notions: the average rank and the
minimum rank of the resources obtained by the agents.
None of the procedures discussed in this paper are specif-
ically designed for optimizing these ranks, even though
these notions capture very natural notions of efficiency
(for the average rank) and fairness (for the min rank). It
thus seems important to study how these allocation pro-
cedures behave on that respect. Of course, moving from
centralized to decentralized procedures incurs a cost that
we analyzed through the price of anarchy, but in fact in-
dividual rationality alone incurs similar costs. To com-
plement these theoretical bounds, we ran experiments
which demonstrated that such swap dynamics provide in
practice very good results. In particular, using the “pri-
ority for the worst off” dynamics provides a particularly
fair and efficient swap-deal procedure, but it involves giv-
ing away in terms of distribution, as agents must coordi-
nate to identify the agent which should deal next (besides
triggering obvious issues of manipulation). Still, simpler
(less informed) dynamics already offer very satisfying re-
sults.
To go further with the experiments, it would be inter-
esting to use real data. Our attempt to use data from Pre-
flib (Mattei and Walsh, 2013) was not successful as there
is no dataset that is single-peaked when there are more
than 5 agents. Getting such preferences would be an in-
teresting way to confirm our results.
Regarding themodel itself, we observe that Bade (2019)
extended the Crawler procedure to single-peaked do-
mains with indifferences. Whether our results with
swap-deal procedures could be similarly generalized is
an avenue for future research.
Overall, this paper raises the exciting issue of giving
a characterization of rules that are efficient, individually
rational and strategy-proof for the single-peaked domain.
Such characterization would follow the spirit of the idea
developed by Sprumont (1991). It would also be interest-
ing to tackle the characterization of the swap-deal proce-
dure efficiency, that is, giving a precise characterization
of the domain on which the swap-deal procedure is effi-
cient. Our maximality result is a significant step in this
sense, it would be nice to complete the picture.
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